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Bennett Zon 
Anthropology, Theology, and the Simplicity of Benedict XVI’s Chant 
 
Introduction 
For a late-Victorian theologian like John Harrington Edwards music is by its very nature 
sacred. Writing in God and Music (1903) he claims that “music . . . speaks of God, from God, 
for God, and to God.”1 Other Victorians considered music to be neither sacred nor secular. 
For them music existed only to serve the basic human need of expression. Evolutionist 
Herbert Spencer epitomizes this materialist view when he suggests that the function of music 
lies entirely within the human mind, to help develop its “language of the emotions.” 2 Chant 
was often caught in this ideological crossfire. For anthropological thinkers like Spencer chant 
was primitive and utilitarian; for theologians like Harrington it was developed and spiritual. 
For both of them, however, chant was also “simple”. For theologians chant encapsulated 
divine simplicity; for anthropologists, human simplicity.3 
Chant continued to be defined by these respective types of simplicity – one 
theological; the other, anthropological – until the 1960s, when unexpectedly commentators 
on the Second Vatican Council seemed to invert anthropological and theological criteria of 
musical simplicity. As this paper argues, they applied anthropological criteria to Gregorian 
chant and theological criteria to primitive chant. Reflecting this ideological switch, and 
ominously for the theological future of church music, Karl Rahner and Herbert Vorgrimler 
preface their translation of the musical documents of Vatican II claiming that church music 
“of its very nature . . . [can] hardly be reconciled with the nature of the liturgy and the basic 
principle of liturgical reform.”4  More frighteningly, while “the treasury of sacred music is to 
be preserved and cultivated with great care”, it does not mean “that this is to be done within 
the framework of the liturgy.”5(97)  If Rahner and Vorgrimler are to be believed then 
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anthropology had usurped theology, and the utility of social function had usurped art. 
Gregorian chant—arguably the most historically artful of all sacred music—began its decent 
down the slow, slippery slope of ideological disrepair. 
Trying to resuscitate the glory of chant and other sacred music seemingly orphaned by the 
Second Vatican Council , Benedict XVI, then Cardinal Ratzinger, decries this state of affairs 
in his famous essay “The Theological Basis for Church Music” (1974; trans. 1986), 
criticizing those who would observe a supposed 
tension between the demands of art and the simplicity of the liturgy”. Benedict 
attributes this tension to a misapprehension in the concept of musical participation. For 
Benedict, unlike Second Vatican commentators on music, active participation in the liturgy 
involves listening as much as it does singing. Listening, in other words, is a type of 
Eucharistic singing, and singing chant (be it singing or listening) is the very essence of divine 
simplicity. In the broadest possible sense this essay uses chant to explore changing meanings 
of liturgical simplicity. The first two sections outlines the two principle forms of 
conceptualizing chant before and after Vatican II, firstly through anthropology and the notion 
of human simplicity, and secondly through theology and the doctrine of divine simplicity. A 
third section explores how changing attitudes towards simplicity affected a redefinition of 
active participation in the revised liturgy, and a fourth and final section examines the 
consequences this redefinition had for the depreciation of Gregorian chant. 
 
Pre-Vatican II chant – anthropology 
Anthropology of simplicity 
 
Simplicity has a well-established pedigree in nineteenth century anthropology, evidenced 
through the history of morphology and evolutionary thought. The earliest formulation of 
simplicity with long-lasting historical traction is Ernst von Baer’s axiom of differentiation, 
3 
 
according to which features become increasingly specialized as they evolve: “The general 
features of a large group of animals appear earlier in the embryo than the special features; 
and “Less general characters are developed from the most general, and so forth, until finally 
the most specialized appear.”6  An unapologetic consumer of German idealism, Victorian 
polymath Herbert Spencer read von Baer and translated his axiom into a principle 
synthetically applicable to all organic and inorganic life: “Whether it be in the development 
of the Earth, in the development of Life upon its surface, the development of Society, of 
Government, of Manufactures, of Commerce, of Language, Literature, Science, Art, this 
same evolution of the simple into the complex, through a process of continuous 
differentiation, holds throughout. From the earliest traceable cosmical changes down to the 
latest results of civilization, we shall find that the transformation of the homogeneous 
[simple] into the heterogeneous [complex], is that in which Progress essentially consists.”7  
Spencer sought verification of his synthetic principle in the recapitulationary theory of Ernst 
Haeckel, for whom “Ontogeny is the short and rapid recapitulation of phylogeny “;8 
accordingly, the growth of the individual embryo (ontogeny) recapitulates the growth of the 
species (phylogeny), so that the human embryo passes in gestation through successive 
evolutionary stages, from protozoa to invertebrate and vertebrate to mammal. Haeckel depicts 
this process in various images, sometimes in embryological schemata and elsewhere as a 
mighty oak crowned by man. 
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Figure 1. Ernst Haeckel, Anthropogenie (1874) and Ernst Haeckel, The Evolution of Man 
1879), originally from Anthropogenie (1874). 
 
Together, the dynamic duo of differentiation and recapitulation protected the values 
of Victorian society, especially imperial, racial values locating white Western man at the top 
of the evolutionary tree. Armed with scientific validation the two paradigms entered the 
anthropological bloodstream of late Victorian culture, redefining the previously uni-
dimensional nature of simplicity. Simplicity was no longer understood as time’s conceptually 
horizontal arrow, shooting teleologically towards complexity, nor was simplicity the first 
conceptual step in of a vertical ladder of ascent towards a greater, more developed form. 
Simplicity was no longer just a conceptual state to be advanced towards complexity, but a 
biological force which had acquired the characteristic of organic internality. Under the rules 
of recapitulation, differentiation gave simplicity a biological imperative, and with it a new 
relationship between cause and effect, individual and the whole. Previously simplicity 
implied no causality whatsoever. Simplicity did not necessarily progress ineluctably towards 
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complexity: it could be a permanent state of its own. In James Cowles Prichard’s Researches 
into the Physical History of Mankind (1813), for instance, simplicity merely denotes 
antiquity: “The simple and primitive form of the Polynesian grammar is one indication of its 
greater antiquity.”9  But in the later work of E. B. Tylor, the father of modern anthropology, 
simplicity attains germinal significance. Writing in his ground-breaking book Primitive 
Culture (1871), Tylor claims that “Civilization, being a process of long and complex growth, 
can only be thoroughly understood when studied through its entire range; that the past is 
continually needed to explain the present, and the whole to explain the part.”10 
Although for Tylor simplicity could remain unchanged——like folk tales, myths or 
primitive rituals or other “survivals” preserved within culture——the very existence of a 
living fossil bore proof of its capacity to evolve into complexity. Thus late nineteenth-century 
anthropologists discerned within culture a dialectical, if unequal, hierarchy favouring the 
complexity of the whole over the simplicity of the individual, the phylogeny of multiplicity 
over the ontogeny of singularity – effectively the empirically higher, civilized descendant 
over its ontologically lower, primitive ancestor. When culture was sociologically relativized 
in the early twentieth century anthropology would retain a phantom, mutual dependency 
between the complex and the simple, the civilized and uncivilized, high and low, group and 
individual. And thus the societal complex, whole or group became the primary focus of 
anthropological investigation, while the individual tended to wither on the vine. 
Anthropological paterfamilias Franz Boas typifies this approach when he claims that “The 
group, not the individual, is always the primary concern of the anthropologist . . . the 
individual is important only as a member of the group.”11  Early to mid twentieth-century 
anthropological opinion eventually divided over this crucial issue. Functionalist Bronislaw 
Malinowski argued that culture functioned to support the basic needs of the individual; 
structural functionalist A. R. Radcliffe-Brown disagreed, believing that the individual 
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functioned to support society. In either case, however, it was complex social function which 
now defined and arbitrated simple individual identities. 
 
Anthropological simplicity of chant 
 
Nineteenth-century music anthropology——or ethnomusicology, if it can be called that——
reflects these same trends, and perhaps unsurprisingly it was polymath Herbert Spencer who 
first came to use them. Spencer contends that music originates in human, impassioned 
speech: “vocal peculiarities which indicated excited feeling are those which especially 
distinguish song from ordinary speech. Every one of the alterations of voice which have 
found to be a physiological result of pain or pleasure is carried to an extreme in vocal music . 
. . in respect alike of loudness, timbre, pitch, intervals, and rate of variation, song employs 
and exaggerates the natural language of the emotions; it arises from a systematic combination 
of those vocal peculiarities which are physiological effects of acute pleasure and pain.”12  
From its origins in impassioned speech music develops into a recognizable historical 
narrative from the simple to the complex: “In music progressive integration is displayed in 
numerous ways. The simple cadence embracing but a few notes, which in the chants of 
savages is monotonously repeated, becomes, among civilized races, a long series of different 
musical phrases combined into one whole; and so complete is the integration that the melody 
cannot be broken off in the middle nor shorn of its final note, without giving us a painful 
sense of incompleteness. When to the air, a bass, a tenor, and an alto are added; and when to 
the different voice-parts there is joined an accompaniment; we see integration of another 
order which grows naturally more elaborate. And the process is carried a stage higher when 
these complex solos, concerted pieces, choruses, and orchestral effects are combined into the 
vast ensemble of an oratorio or a musical drama.”13 
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As this suggests, Spencer translates musical origins into a developmental paradigm 
exemplified in the sliding scale of the Great Chain of Being, from the simplest to most 
complex – from the most savage to most civilized. At its most rudimentary position are 
savages, with their monotonous, barely evolved “dance-chants” akin to the earliest 
expressions of man: “That music is a product of civilization is manifest; for though some of 
the lowest savages have their dance-chants, these are of a kind scarcely to be dignified by the 
title musical: at most, they supply but the vaguest rudiment of music, properly so called. And 
if music has been by slow steps developed in the course of civilization, it must have been 
developed out of something. If, then, its origin is not that above alleged, what is its origin?”14  
By giving chant such an important, transitional position in the history of musical origins 
Spencer ensured that the trope of simplicity would become ingrained in nineteenth- and early 
twentieth century histories of music. Composer and historian C Hubert H Parry (1848-18) is 
probably the most prolific Spencerian musicologist of time. Paraphrasing Spencer, Parry 
equates chant with folk music and folk music with savage music in his influential The Art of 
Music (1893; in 1896 re-titled The Art of the Evolution of Music): “The basis of all music and 
the very first steps in the long story of musical development are to be found in the musical 
utterances of the most undeveloped and unconscious types of humanity, such as 
unadulterated savages and inhabitants of lonely isolated districted well removed from any of 
the influences of education and culture. Such savages are in the same position in relation to 
music as the remote ancestors of the race before the story of the artistic development of many 
began.”15  As such, the earliest music is, by definition, simple: a chant of Australian savages 
represents a “simple figure”; folk music of British Columbia alternates “simple figures”; and 
a Romanian folk song is “unusually simple in part, but very characteristic as a whole”; folk 
tunes of the world are simple patterns.”16 
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By the turn of the century ethnomusicology, like anthropology, had begun to 
reformulate its understanding of simplicity. The founding father of British ethnomusicology, 
Charles Samuel Myers, speaks for a methodologically transitional ethnomusicology, when he 
updates Spencer and equates the musical impulse to instinct, and instinct to a type of 
consciousness derived from past rudimentary experience.17  When a chick pecks for the first 
time, he maintains, it has already acquired “a vague awareness of the result of its first peck, 
before it has actually performed the action”;18 it has a consciousness which is “the embryonic 
representative of meaning”.19  Belief in an embryonic representative of meaning led to an 
evolutionary model of human growth Myers called accrescence, “the “carving” of new parts 
out of the old. The old may grow in the process; it may and does by accrescence add new 
material to itself. It also combines into larger unity by union with others.”20  Musically, 
accrescence follows eight key recapitulationary stages, like Haeckels tree or embryos: (1) 
discrimination between noises and tones; (2) awareness of differences in loudness, pitch, 
duration, character and quality; (3) awareness of absolute pitch; (4) appreciation and use of 
(small) approximately equal tone-distances; (5) appreciation and use of (larger) consonant 
intervals and the development of small intervals in relation thereto; (6) melodic phrasing; (7) 
rhythmic phrasing; and (8) musical meaning.21  Recalibrating the parameters of musical 
simplicity, Myers locates primitive chant not at the beginning, but at the apex, of this process 
– with musical meaning. 
Thus begins primitive simplicity’s newly recalibrated life at the disciplinary apex of 
comparative musicology and comparative anthropology. Like the society it reflects, Myers”s 
primitive chant gradually acquired a functionalist anthropological hue. Becoming a study in 
individual cultural adaptation it increasingly located simplicity within the terms of its own 
musical culture rather than any external (Western) comparators. Other ethnomusicologists 
reflect this development. Trying to solve the problem of style in Indian music, George 
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Herzog, for example, suggests that “we have to consider the current notions of tribal or 
national styles as integrated, homogeneous pictures which tend after due time to assimilate 
new additions to their background, maintaining and restoring their “original” integrity.”22  
Cultural adaptationism would ethicize methodology while extolling societal musical 
identities. Chant was no longer merely an aesthetic object to be positioned in the great, if 
discreditable, arc of Western musical development, but an aesthetic product judged in its own 
terms, and unlike earlier comparative musicologists modern ethnomusicologists were 
concerned with “the behavior employed in producing it, and the emotions and ideation of the 
artist involved in it.”23  The progression from object to product concentrated attention on 
chant’s social functionality. Thus, like its other cultural counterparts, primitive chant evolved 
into a function of culturally inscribed physical, verbal and social behavior rather than an 
entity with absolute aesthetic properties. No longer archetypal chant——simple, primitive, 
non-Western——it became merely another type of music of a particular people and its 
society. 
 
Pre-Vatican II chant – theology 
Theology of simplicity 
Until the Second Vatican, chant was theologized under the doctrine of divine simplicity. Like 
its anthropological parallel, the doctrine coalesced in the nineteenth century under the 
influence of an organic philosophy situating unity within diversity and parts within wholes. 
Franz Anton Staudenmaier typifies this view, encapsulating differentiation (progression from 
simplicity to complexity) and recapitulation (ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny). For 
Staudenmeier “the historical process is itself a revelation of the Absolute: the meaning of 
history is to be identified as the history of God . . . [as] a vision of history where, as in a 
covenant dialogue, divine hypostases are disclosed for the sake of personal union with their 
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human images.”24  Staudenmaier also contends that man is rooted in a profoundly 
incarnational Christology: “The world is God”s idea of the world brought into being, and the 
perfection of the original world consisted in the fact, that it absolutely corresponded to the 
Divine idea.”25  Gerald McCool describes Staudenmaier”s combination of differentiation and 
recapitulation as representing “an intelligibility in sacred history . . . undeducible divine 
freedom and not [simply] the metaphysical necessity of a divine architectonic idea.”26  For 
any good neo-Thomist like Staudenmaier, divine simplicity not only explained the 
relationship of man and God but the relationship of God and His creation. Echoing these two 
strands neo-Thomist theologian Jacques Maritain describes divine simplicity as “a limitless 
instant which indivisibly embraces the whole succession of time”;27 “the Act of Existing, 
subsistent by itself, is above the whole order of beings, perfections, [and] existences which 
are its created participations.”28   
 As an expression and embodiment of divine aseity, pre-Vatican II simplicity resisted 
an ideational approach to theology. Reflecting this, von Balthasar, for example, translates 
divine simplicity into a theological aesthetic leading from the reality of Christ and God”s 
immutability to the relationship of expression and dialogue. This is “reality of a real I/Thou 
exchange within God who is love . . . Christ as personal expression and dialogue partner of 
the Father becomes the exemplar of our relationship with God.”29  At a linguistic level 
Balthasar enriches this relationship by what Peter Casarella depicts as “a metaphysics of 
expressive transcendentality.”30  Distinguishing – but not dividing – the beautiful as both 
expression and dialogue, and by analogy expression and form, Balthasar recapitulates an 
aesthetic of the beautiful within an incarnational theology. Balthasar follows Thomas, 
creating a dynamic exegetical continuum between “theological aesthetics” and “aesthetic 
theology”, theological beauty and worldly beauty. As Oliver Davies suggests, in this way 
Balthasar “constantly brings to the fore the Incarnation as the divine taking on a particular 
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and material existence.”31  For Balthasar, “the whole truth of this mystery is that the 
movement which God (who is the object that is seen in Christ and who enraptures man) 
effects in man (even in his unwillingness and recalcitrance, due to sin), is co-effected 
willingly by man through his Christian Eros and, indeed, on account of the fact that the 
divine Spirit en-thuses and in-spires man to collaboration.”32   
To function organically this relationship must preserve the integrity of individual and 
whole, for “when Being is confronted as love the threat which infinity poses to finitude 
vanishes.”33  The influence of Rahner is observable in this construction of a transcendental 
theological anthropology. Rahner underscores transcendentalism in his mystagogical 
approach: “the essence of knowledge lies in the mystery which is the object of primary 
experience . . . the incomprehensible mystery, in relation to which the openness of 
transcendence is experienced.”34  Stated more boldly: “In the primary realization of his being 
and in the philosophical reflection derived from it, man comes to be himself and here he does 
not experience himself as the dominant, absolute subject, but as the one whose being is 
bestowed upon him by the mystery . . . the one whose self is granted to him by the 
Mystery.”35  Illuminated in and by incarnational mystery, divine simplicity became 
ideologically prepositional in the heavily neo-Thomist, pre-Second Vatican theological 
anthropology. Writing in The Discovery of God (1956) Henri de Lubac paraphrases Blondel, 
arguing that “nothing can be thought without positing the Absolute in relating it to that 
Absolute; nothing can be willed without tending toward the Absolute, nor valued unless 
weighed in terms of the Absolute.”36  The same could easily apply to Edward Schillebeeckx, 
for example, whose work expresses the conviction that the meaning of human life is 
grounded in, and only understood in relation to, the mystery of God.37  Neo-Thomist 
Schillebeeckx sounds just like Staudenmaier: “God reveals himself by revealing humanity to 
itself.”38   
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Theological simplicity of chant 
The irreducible nature of divine simplicity typifies writers utilizing theological hermeneutics 
to compare chant to human nature. A good English example is Anglican convert and Catholic 
priest Henry Formby (1816-84). Formby was at Oxford when the deeply divisive, 
Catholicising theological movement, the Oxford Movement, was in full swing. He was a 
friend of its principal force John Henry Newman, and as a trained Anglican priest and later 
Roman Catholic priest was immersed in the highly charged theological debates of the time. 
Formby addresses plain chant in three theologically characteristic treatises, The 
Catholic Christian”s Guide to the Right Use of Christian Psalmody and of the Psalter 
(1846); The Plain Chant, The Image and Symbol of the Humanity of our Divine Redeemer 
and the Blessed Mary (1848); and The Roman Ritual and its Canto Fermo (1849). In The 
Catholic Christian”s Guide Formby identifies chant with the indelible simplicity of creation: 
“Popular Christian Psalmody, in its simple form, is so little intricate, that it admits of being 
learnt, as language itself, without direct instruction.”39  Accordingly, there is no greater 
simplicity than that found in the unison chanting of plainsong; it is the very epitome of divine 
simplicity itself: “The glorious type in nature of the Church”s song, the unwearied and never-
failing song of generations and ages, is the roar of the sea, whose waves beat in unison on the 
shore. Again, what is a more precious practical truth than Unity, the “Communio 
Sanctorum?” and how can there be on earth a more perfect typical expression of this, than the 
vast unisonous song of a multitude, who, with one mouth and one heart, glorify their God and 
their Redeemer – where the voices of all, young men and maidens, old men and children, are, 
as it were, the voice of one person.”40 
In The Plain Chant and other writings that one person is never just the Catholic 
church, but God Himself: “The idea contained in the following pages, of the Song of the 
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Divine Office being a symbol of our Lord”s Incarnation, is but part of an idea capable of 
being exemplified in every means that the Catholic Church has taken to manifest the 
Godhead Incarnate, whose kingdom she is to men.”41  As exemplar of the Godhead Incarnate 
chant was also “designed by our Divine Redeemer to pourtray (sic), in a perceptible and 
intelligible manner, the attributes and characteristics of the human nature, which He took to 
Himself from His blessed Mother, and this in the manner of an abiding manifestation of 
Himself in the Church.”42  Like all good Thomists, Formby relies upon a theory of divine 
simplicity to evoke a sacramental experience of God: “Song is gifted with the inherent 
capability of being a manifestation of our blessed Lord”s humanity”, and with “the 
mysterious power of symbolising the Man-God, and manifesting Him in a sacramental but 
intelligible manner to all who hear, and in an especial degree, to those who sing”.43  In The 
Roman Ritual the theological stakes are even higher. Plainchant, Formby claims, is the 
Exemplar or Pattern – the essence of divine simplicity, the “absolute correspondence to the 
Divine idea”. 
If chant were the “absolute correspondence to the Divine idea” it would be reflected 
in the intentions of reformers to express the quality of that relationship in broader terms. 
Rector of the Propaganda College in Rome, Father Loreto Jacovacci circulated a letter on the 
matter which would eventually attract the interest of Ratisbon reformer Franz Xavier Haberl; 
according to Jacovacci “The Church has wisely directed that this chant be joined to her 
liturgy. Hence it should be necessary to restore the school of Gregorian chant to its pristine 
splendor and to urge clerics more forcefully to use it constantly.”44  Unwittingly, Jacovacci”s 
restorational concerns belie an arguably more urgent theological imperative. Restoring chant 
requires a parallel restoration (or reinforcement) of its theology, but like so many well-
intentioned contemporary reformers Jacovacci voices concern over the practical 
anthropological surface of chant rather than its theoretical, theological underlay: “The choral 
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books in many churches which are in present use are imperfect, inauthentic, and often times 
corrupted.”45  In some respects the quality or type of restoration is theologically insignificant, 
or at the very least culturally constructed. Ratisbon”s monopolist project to create uniformity 
is known to have spectacularly failed ultimately because it relied upon previously reformed 
Guidettian forms – reform by replicating reform is not, in other words, reform at all.46  
Solesmes was obviously more successful at reforming chant, not because it increased 
uniformity or authenticity, but because it used the authenticity of chant to reinterpret and 
revitalize the meaning of divine simplicity. Ratisbon editions may imitate Tridentine reform, 
but they were ultimately more political than theological, with decrees positively oozing with 
the consolidation of power: “The opinions and petitions put forth last year by the Convention 
at Arezzo . . . towards restoring the liturgical Gregorian chant to its ancient tradition, cannot 
be received and approved as stated.”47 
At a time when chant represented the “absolute correspondence to the Divine idea” 
Ratisbon was theologically out of step because the reinvigoration of Tridentine reforms only 
partially responded to the exigencies of divine simplicity. The Solesmes revival went right to 
the Church”s theological fountainhead, like divine simplicity itself. Its founder, Dom Prosper 
Guéranger, provides a telling, representative sampling in early communications: “Who has 
not tasted the charm of so many [Gregorian] pieces sublime or original, stamped by the 
geniuses of the centuries past . . . What Christian has ever been able to hear the Paschal chant 
of the Haec Dies without be tried with that vague sentiment of the infinite, as if Jehovah 
Himself was having His majestic voice heard?  And who has not heard . . . an entire 
congregation making the sacred vaults of the roof resound with the inspired accents of the 
Gaudeamus, without his being brought back through the ages, to the epoch when the echoes 
of subterranean Rome resounded with this triumphant chant?”48  Guéranger”s imagined 
“communitatis” – to paraphrase Benedict Anderson”s term “imagined communities” – is 
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reflected in the enduring language of Pius X”s famous motu proprio, Tra le sollecitudini 
(1903): “Gregorian chant . . . is . . . the proper chant of the Roman Church, the only chant 
which she inherited from the ancient Fathers, which she has jealously kept for so many 
centuries in her liturgical books, which she offers to the faithful as her own music, which she 
insists on being used exclusively in some parts of her liturgy, and which lastly, has been so 
happily restored to its original perfection and purity by recent study.”49  Even considering 
later refinements the essence of Pius X”s words would continue to resonate across the 
decades, even to the Second Vatican Council and beyond. Although no longer overtly 
humanized Christologically,  like Formby”s chant, in its mystical, mystagogical relationship 
of individuality and universality chant reflects and embodies the immutable purity, originality 
and authenticity – the divine simplicity – of the Church: Musica Sacra Disciplina (1955) 
states that “if in Catholic churches through the entire world Gregorian chant sounds forth 
without corruption or diminution, the chant itself, like the sacred Roman liturgy, will have a 
characteristic of universality, so that the faithful, wherever they may be, will hear music that 
is familiar to them and a part of their home. In this way they may experience, with much 
spiritual consolation, the wonderful unity of the Church.”50 
 
Theological anthropology and the simplicity of the liturgy 
Contained within their own disciplinary boundaries anthropology and theology maintained a 
perfectly constructive tension between the relativism of the individual and the absolutism of 
the universal. But by the 1960s methodologies began jumping disciplinary fences, 
contributing eventually to the type of intellectual cooperation Clifford Geertz would 
characterize as “blurred genres.”51  In theological anthropology this involved a reappraisal of 
the human person from a finite, naturally contingent, socially and culturally constructed 
individual to a transcendentally totalized human being – to “humanity as determined by the 
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other”. Reading Barth”s Church Dogmatics Ray Anderson describes theological 
anthropology as a type of three-fold “co-humanity” – humanity as determination of the Word 
of God, a determination of being with others, and the determination of one person with the 
other: “The determination of humanity in general as being with others does not dissolve 
individual being into corporate being, but results in a determination of humanity in its 
singularity as well as its plurality. This singularity, however, is experienced as a reciprocity 
of being, that is, a being of one with the other and also, to an extent, for the other.”52  Barth 
own words emphasize anthropocentric relationality, conceptualizing humankind as “one of 
two foci of the ellipse of revelation”:53 “Who and what man is no less specifically and 
emphatically declared by the Word of God than who and what God is.”54 
There are liturgical implications for Barth”s type of reasoning on divine simplicity. 
According to Barth God exists in holy immutability: “There is such a thing as a holy 
mutability in God. He is above all ages. But above them is their Lord . . . and therefore as 
One who – as Master and in His own way – partakes in the alteration, so that there is 
something corresponding to that alteration in His own essence. His constancy consists in the 
fact that he is always the same in every change.”55  Barth calls this constancy “the pure 
immobile”.56  If, as he argues, God is pure immobile, He is not immobile in the sense of stasis 
but the dynamic liveliness and absolute actuality of divine simplicity.57  He is so innately 
dynamic that nothing can make him more active. He is “act pure and simple.”58  It is act pure 
and simple – pure immobility – that attracts the attention of Second Vatican reformational 
zeal; pure immobility which sparks the flash-point of theological and anthropological 
frictions in the Church; and pure immobility which Benedict XVI targets when trying to 
interpret and define the role of music within the liturgy. 
Sacrosanctum Concilium (1963) enunciates the Church”s much vaunted revisionary 
attitude towards liturgical participation of the laity.59  The word “participation” appears 
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sixteen times, in twelve instances preceded by the word “active”. The second section of the 
document is headed “The Promotion of Liturgical Instruction and Active Participation”. Point 
14, the first under this heading, states that “Mother Church earnestly desires that all the 
faithful should be led to that fully conscious, and active participation in liturgical celebrations 
which is demanded by the very nature of the liturgy.”60  Jungmann contends that liturgy 
configures worshippers as Eucharistic living sacrifice, and as such active participants in the 
liturgical action.61  Marsili describes this activity as two-fold, combining the personal 
interiority of Eucharistic experience with the collective exteriority of worship: “The Eucharist 
really implies interior dynamic movement, since it is not a form of worship expressed by 
human religiousness, but an action (“do this”), which brings us infinite vitality within the 
reality of the mystery that is in Christ, the only Priest of the New Testament . . . This interior 
movement, which is a separation from oneself and an adhering to God, is the natural requisite 
for the Eucharistic “mystery of worship,” and at the same time a justification for that external 
action of the Christian assembly which is being rightly called “active participation.”62 
“Active participation” is a problematical term because the combination of active and 
participation seems tautological, even redundant. But the writers of Sacrosanctum Concilium 
were making two key points. Firstly they were trying to equate “conscious” with “active” in 
the same way they were trying to equate interior with exterior. But interior and exterior, for 
example, are not necessarily the same as conscious and active. An interior experience can be 
active, and an exterior one conscious. A conscious act is one such example. Secondly, they 
were trying to equate action with participation and participation with sacramental immersion. 
To equate conscious with active is also to equate unconscious with inactive, but the corollary 
is not true: to equate active with interior is not to equate inactive with exterior. They are not 
really opposites; in other words, activity can be either interior or exterior, or both in 
combination, and active participation should not necessarily depend upon a definition which 
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deems activity to necessitate both internal and external involvement beyond essential 
sacramental obligations like the Eucharist. Complete activity is not necessarily total activity, 
and neither is total activity necessarily participation: what is needed is a “conscious 
participation elevating the heart and soul, which expresses itself in – is aided by – the exterior 
rite.”63  Despite this instruction Sacrosanctum Concilium considers activity form and 
participation function. And here are the roots of its problem: as form, activity—conscious 
interiority—is theological; as function, participation—liturgical exteriority—is 
anthropological—one might even say “religious.” Moreover, while activity is individual, and 
participation corporate, God”s simplicity dictates that form and function are indissolubly 
connected in “co-humanity” – in what Barth depicts as “pure immobile”. But if participating 
actively in the pure immobile means co-humanity is achieved only by combination of activity 
and participation, form and function, interiority and exteriority then the doctrine of God”s 
simplicity is threatened. To reinterpret von Balthasar: if simplicity is threatened “when Being 
is confronted as love the threat which infinity poses to finitude” struggles to vanish. 
It was this same threat which Benedict XVI sensed when considering the place of 
Gregorian chant in the liturgy. What he noticed was a misconceived interpretation of 
liturgical simplicity and a concomitant misunderstanding over the phrase “full and active 
participation”. In “The Body and the Liturgy” Benedict objects to imbalanced readings of 
participatio actuosa emphasizing externality, claiming instead that the ideational multiplicity 
of what he calls “part-icipation” requires far more developed understandings of action.64  To 
acquire that understanding Benedict begins by focusing on the transubstantive action of God 
in the Eucharist in which the distinction between actio Christi and actio humani are entirely 
dissolved, negating, collapsing – or ultimately fulfilling – the communion of man”s 
singularity and singularities with God”s unified and unifying multiplicities. Admittedly 
separate from the sacramental celebration, elements of the Liturgy of the Word, like singing 
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and reading, play their part in supporting a liturgy “that makes concrete in divine worship the 
fundamental structure of divine action.”65  In this theologically analogical concept Benedict 
arrives at his understanding of music, for here he deems musical functions to differ according 
to their analogical relationship to divine action. There are psalms and hymns, and then there 
is the “new song” which the Church sings “as she goes off toward the music of the New 
Heaven and New Earth. This explains why, in addition to congregational singing, Christian 
liturgy of its very nature finds a suitable place for the choir, and for musical instruments, too, 
which no purism about collective singing should be allowed to contest.”66  The musical 
aesthetic of Benedict’s theological anthropology begins to crystalize: choral music represents 
God and congregational music, man. The recapitulationary analogy does stop there, however, 
because congregational music can also represent God. But if congregational music represents 
God, what type of music represents man?  Benedict’s answer is equally clear: it is not another 
type of music; it is listening. For Benedict active participation involves not just active 
singing, but active listening as well, not just to music but also to text, because liturgical 
listening and singing recapitulate the divine simplicity in which all men are intended and 
born to participate: “the conception of activity . . . the power of shared listening, shared 
wonder, the shared experience of being moved at a level deeper than words. At all events, 
one thing has become clear in recent years: the retreat into utility has not made the liturgy 
more open; it has only impoverished it. This is not the way to create the required 
simplicity.”67 
 
Conclusion: theological anthropology and the simplicity of chant 
For Benedict listening characterizes an active participatory elevation – not abandonment – of 
the senses, and because of its sacramental exigency he deems certain types of church music 
more liturgically suitable – or divinely simple – than others. Perhaps inevitably, popular 
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music gets low marks for spiritualization, and so too does ethnic music: “The cultic music of 
pagan religions has a different status in human existence from the music which glorifies God 
in creation.”68   Conversely, as the greatest paradigm of the musical Word Gregorian chant is 
“the supreme model of sacred music.”69  Following Sacrosanctum Concilium 116, Benedict 
maintains that “The Church acknowledges Gregorian chant as specially suited to the Roman 
liturgy: therefore, other things being equal, it should be given pride of place in liturgical 
services.” 
As Benedict and many other cantofiles observe, however, the theory and practice, 
anthropology and theology, of Vatican II are frequently incompatible when it comes to 
liturgical music, and especially to chant. But why is this?  What changed?  I think the 
problem is down to a change in the way Second Vatican commentators define simplicity. 
Benedict rehearses numerous reasons for the decline of chant and sacred music generally, but 
it is the concept of participation which stands out more than any other: “so-called creativity, 
in the active participation of all present”, he suggests, does not reflect the spirit of conciliar 
liturgical intention. Instead, Benedict claims, there is “an idolization of sociology at work”,70 
a sociology which revises our conception of the individual in relation to the whole, confusing 
the individual, yet corporate, expression of God”s Word with the ecclesial statement of the 
liturgy – the communion sanctorum. As Rahner, Barth and many other theologians have 
shown, the communio sanctorum has a special place in theologies of chant because it is 
embodies the unity of the individual in relation to the whole. Recall Henry Formby”s words: 
“what is a more precious practical truth than Unity, the “Communio Sanctorum?” and how 
can there be on earth a more perfect typical expression of this, than the vast unisonous song 
of a multitude, who, with one mouth and one heart, glorify their God and their Redeemer – 
where the voices of all, young men and maidens, old men and children, are, as it were, the 
voice of one person.”71  For Benedict, as Formby, in its theological incarnation chant 
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represents the epitome of divine simplicity – the perfect hypostatic union of words and music, 
music and man, man and God. 
In practice, however, the post-conciliar story of chant is rather degenerational, 
especially in parish churches, and this is the crux of the problem. In theory chant is 
theological, embodying divine simplicity in all its ecclesial richness; in practice, however, 
chant is anthropological, encapsulating human simplicity in all its equanimous cultural 
manifestations and forms. The reality of the situation is nothing new. Not long ago 
Beliefnet.com recently posted a blog called “Gregorian Chant Comeback”, recapitulating the 
need for training the clergy if Gregorian chant were to have a chance at staging a comeback. 
Benedict, it proffers, should reinvest in chant, and resurrect the church”s aesthetic morbidity 
towards its musical past. But Beliefnet does not really get to the root of the problem – only its 
symptoms. Training the clergy, according to Beliefnet, implies musical, practical, training. 
But training needs to go much deeper than that. It needs to revisit the theological concepts 
which undergird practical understanding, and the theological – not anthropological – 
aesthetics which inform that understanding. 
Why is there this disparity between theological theory and anthropological practice?  
Why has Gregorian chant conceptually dropped the “Gregorian” and become simply another 
kind of music?  What happened to our world view which has caused this change in aesthetic 
value?  There are many well-known answers: Gregorian chant needs to be well rehearsed; it 
does not necessarily communicate equally well across all cultural contexts; it is considered to 
be old-fashioned, alienating and reminiscent of an out-of-touch church – the reasons are 
myriad. Another reason might be found in the way modern musicology has embraced 
ethnomusicology – even as early as C. Hubert H. Parry’s famous history of music, The 
Evolution of the Art of Music (1893). Being an anthropological discipline, ethnomusicology 
studies chant as religion, not theology, reflecting an objectification of music not found in its 
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theological counterpart. Ethnomusicology treats chant objectively, like a science. It talks of 
“musics”, not “music” – of multiplicities, not unities. Taking this thinking to its logical 
conclusion would make Herbert Spencer the first ethnomusicologist, because it was Spencer 
who was first to postulate chant as an evolutionary form of human expression. Spencer 
ushered in a new era in history by re-conceptualizing chant as anthropology, while Formby 
clung to its theological formulations. Both considered chant simple, but for largely dissimilar 
– if not diametrically opposed – reasons. 
This classic division between theology and anthropology – embodied in two different 
concepts of the same thing – simplicity – is the irresolvable, contradictory inheritance of 
Second Vatican theory and practice. Viewed theoretically, theology beat anthropology in the 
struggle for chant’s survival, but viewed practically, it was anthropology that was naturally 
selected (to use a Darwinian term). Crudely put, as theologians see it, anthropology is 
emboldened by an evolutionary science concerned only with mechanisms of change. 
Anthropology reduces history to narrative, and humanity to man. As anthropologists see it, 
theology is driven by teleological notions of Design. Theology inflates narrative into history, 
and man into God. Somewhere in the middle of this disciplinary caricature, simplicity teaches 
us how to reinterpret the dilemma of chant without resorting to well-worn arguments. It asks 
not only how but why changing notions of simplicity effected changes in musical aesthetics, 
and why changes in musical aesthetics have driven a yawning chasm between theory and 
practice. Yes, Gregorian chant thrives in some religious communities, in fewer cathedrals and 
the odd parish church, but it is always because those communities overcame anthropological 
individualism militating against ecclesial expression of the Word. Amongst the many 
conclusions Benedict reaches in Feast of Faith is the fact that there is a difference between 
“banal simplism” and the simplicity which is the expression of maturity. Is anthropology 
banal [human] simplism and theology the mature expression of [divine] simplicity?  
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Understanding the true simplicity of chant may help answer that question, but the quest for 
reinstatement is far from over in a world manifestly divided by the separate but not unrelated 
ideologies of science and religion, anthropology and theology, theory and practice. 
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